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JOHN H. FANNING LABOR LAW WRITING
COMPETITION WINNER
CAVEAT FIDUCIARIUS: UNIONS, PENSION FUND
INVESTMENTS, AND THE CAPITAL-PRE-
RECOGNITION AGREEMENT EXCHANGE
Richard Victor Schmidt Luna'
Labor unions have experienced a protracted, gradual decline in
membership.' There are many reasons for the decline.2 Employers
continue their increasingly aggressive resistance to union organizing
drives by taking advantage of both the weak remedies of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the National Labor Relations Board's
(NLRB) administrative delays.3 In response to this decline, modern
labor unions are developing new strategies, many of which work outside
4of the traditional labor law framework. These strategies include pre-
recognition agreements, which "assist unions in increasing membership
without the need for the lengthy, expensive, and ultimately unpredictable
Office of Chief Counsel, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation; J.D., May 2005,
Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professors Roger Hartley, John Leary, Regina Jefferson, and Antonio Perez; the
attorneys and staff at Mooney, Green, Baker & Saindon, P.C.; and his wife and family for
their generous encouragement, guidance, and support.
1. See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of
Labor, Union Members in 2004 (Jan. 27, 2005), at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.
nr0.htm. The Bureau of Labor Statistics stated:
In 2004, 12.5 percent of wage and salary workers were union members, down
from 12.9 percent in 2003, the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics reported today. The union membership rate has steadily declined from
a high of 20.1 percent in 1983, the first year for which comparable union data are
available.
Id.
2. See Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the
Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 482-83 (1993).
3. See Andrew Strom, Rethinking the NLRB's Approach to Union Recognition
Agreements, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 50, 50-51 (1994).
4. Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition
Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 369, 371-72 (2001).
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process of the NLRB."5 Another strategy is the corporate campaign, a
tactic that puts a new spin on traditional picketing.6  Corporate
campaigns use publicity to generate political pressure on employers from
the people, entities, and communities that deal with an employer to force
the employer into concessions.7 The labor union of the twenty-first-
century has also employed a third strategy: it has taken on an unexpected
role as a savvy institutional investor.8
This paper focuses on labor unions' use of pre-recognition agreements
and the investment strategies available to obtain them. Both pre-
recognition agreements and investment strategies are important because
of their tremendous potential for expanding union membership and
because they differ significantly from traditional union organizing
activity. Pre-recognition agreements take effect before a union gains
recognition as the bargaining representative for a unit. By using pre-
recognition agreements, unions can eliminate the most significant barrier
to a union organizing campaign: employer resistance. By using
innovative investment strategies, unions have moved from the picket line
to the board room to obtain union jobs or union-friendly terms. This
paper examines the viability of using both strategies together by
exploring whether unions can tap the tremendous investment capital
amassed in union pension funds in order to secure pre-recognition
agreements from the companies those funds invest in. Section I defines
pre-recognition agreements, their application, and their strengths and
weaknesses. Section II identifies pension fund capital as a source of
leverage for securing pre-recognition agreements. Section III examines
the limitations and liabilities that ERISA (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act) fiduciary obligations impose on the use of pension assets.
In that section, this paper warns that courts have interpreted ERISA
more strictly than other non-binding authorities. The result is that
ERISA, as courts read it, may prohibit those who manage pension
investments from considering benefits to either unions or employers in
the pension investment selection process. The reason for such strict
interpretation is to avoid abuses by unions and employers alike. Section
IV briefly explains the effect that other fiduciary duties have on the
pension investment selection process. Section V identifies the narrow
financial justification under which pension plans might be able to arrange
pre-recognition agreements in exchange for their investment capital, and
5. Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality Agreements: Will the NLRB Sanction Its Own
Obsolescence?, 16 LAB. LAW. 201, 201-02 (2000).
6. See Stanley J. Brown & Alyse Bass, Corporate Campaigns: Employer Responses
to Labor's New Weapons, 6 LAB. LAW. 975, 976 (1990).
7. Strom, supra note 3, at 58.
8. Hartley, supra note 4, at 395.
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suggests that negotiating union-friendly pension investment strategies
during collective bargaining could expand their use and simultaneously
reduce investment managers' exposure to liability for fiduciary breach.
This paper then proposes that courts have interpreted ERISA to prevent
pension plan fiduciaries from considering the benefits that investment
strategies in general would generate for the union, and more importantly,
for the employer. This paper goes on to argue that nonetheless, there are
legitimate financial motives for seeking pre-recognition agreements in
particular. This paper also suggests that unions should negotiate union-
friendly investment strategies for their pension funds during collective
bargaining. Finally, this paper concludes that, despite the limitations on
fiduciaries and their management of pension plan assets, unions should
encourage fiduciaries to use plan assets to leverage pre-recognition
agreements in ways that work within the limitations of ERISA and the
collective bargaining framework.
I. PRE-RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS ARE AN EFFECTIVE ORGANIZING
STRATEGY
The term "pre-recognition agreement" encompasses a broad range of
agreements between unions and employers. 9 Pre-recognition agreements
typically eliminate specified types of employer resistance to union
organizing activities as delineated in the terms of the agreement."0 Two
types of pre-recognition agreements are neutrality agreements and card-
check recognition agreements." Neutrality agreements reduce or
eliminate aggressive employer anti-union speech during a union• • 12
organizing. Neutrality agreements accomplish this by either completely
silencing employer anti-union speech, or by less restrictive means, such
as requiring both union and employer to be civil.13 By contrast, card-
check agreements may allow the employer to campaign against the union
without restraint.'4  However, card-check agreements require the
employer to recognize the union if a majority of the employees in a
bargaining unit sign cards authorizing the union to act as their bargaining
representative. 15  Pre-recognition agreements can contain other
9. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 203 (referring specifically to neutrality agreements).
10. See Hartley, supra note 4, at 372.
11. Cohen, supra note 5, at 202-03.
12. Id. at 203.
13. Hartley, supra note 4, at 379-80.
14. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 203.
15. Id.
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provisions as well, but a full exposition is beyond the scope of this
16paper.
Pre-recognition agreements are not a new or rare strategy, because
"some unions employed neutrality agreements as early as the mid-
1970s."' 7 Their use continues, and as recently as 2004, Kaiser Aluminum
and the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) adopted a neutrality
agreement after the company emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy
18reorganization. A number of other unions have employed neutrality
agreements, including the Communications Workers of America, the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the Bakery,
Confectionary and Tobacco Workers, the Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees, and the IUE.1 9
Pre-recognition agreements significantly increase the likelihood that a
union organizing campaign will result in recognition. 0 Evidence of this
success can be seen in the fact that "the United Food and Commercial
Workers ... claimed to have organized 70,000 new workers in 1996 and
almost 74,000 in 1997 by card check alone., 21 Unions gained recognition
in sixty-eight percent of organizing campaigns covered by pre-
recognition agreements, compared to only forty-six percent that
12depended solely on the outcome of NLRB elections. In addition to
increasing the odds of gaining recognition, pre-recognition agreements
increase the likelihood that, once an employer recognizes a union as a
16. For a more complete treatment of pre-recognition agreements, see id. (describing
various provisions that can be included in neutrality agreements) and Hartley, supra note
4, at '377-78 (describing how neutrality agreements redress the disadvantages faced by
unions when organizing). Pre-recognition agreements might constitute employer
assistance to a union in violation of § 8(a)(2) of the Taft-Hartley Act, particularly if they
contain substantive contract provisions covering conditions of employment. See id. at 401.
Plaintiffs have begun to suggest that a neutrality agreement constitutes a thing of value
from an employer to a union in violation of § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA). Patterson v. Heartland Indus. Partners, LLP, 225 F.R.D. 204, 205 (N.D. Ohio
2004) ("Plaintiffs contend that a neutrality agreement ... constitutes a thing of value [and
thus is a] violation of § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act.").
17. Hartley, supra note 4, at 377.
18. Press Release, Business Wire, Kaiser Aluminum and USWA Outline Details of
Agreement in Principle (Jan. 30, 2004), WL 1/30/04 BWIRE 23:59:00.
19. Cohen, supra note 5, at 202 ("[Tjhe Communications Workers of America... the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the Bakery, Confectionary and Tobacco
Workers, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees . . . and the IUE, have also
been successful in securing neutrality agreements.").
20. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1604 (2002).
21. Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card
Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 46 (2001) (citations omitted).
22. Estlund, supra note 20, at 1604 n.322.
[Vol. 54:13131316
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bargaining agent, the union will secure a first contract. 3 In comparison
to NLRB elections, pre-recognition agreements effectively double the
24likelihood that an organizing campaign will conclude in a first contract.
Considering the likelihood of success of organizing under pre-
recognition agreements, why would a union attempt to organize without
one? One problem is that several legal issues surrounding pre-
21recognition agreements remain largely untested. It is unclear whether a
union may insist on a pre-recognition agreement to impasse during
collective bargaining. 6 Also, the NLRB has not yet determined whether
or under what circumstances pre-recognition agreements constitute
unlawful employer assistance to a labor organization under the NLRA.27
Finally, pre-recognition agreements may be difficult to enforce.28
Another reason unions do not obtain pre-recognition agreements more
often is as simple as it is common sense: employers who are resistant to
the unionization of their workers are equally resistant to agreements that
29would enhance that outcome . Consequently, unions typically secure
these agreements only from employers over which they have leverage.0
This leverage can come from a number of sources. Unions that have
existing bargaining relationships with employers might incorporate pre-
recognition agreements that apply to related companies or divisions as
part of renewing their existing collective bargaining agreements.3'
23. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 21, at 52-53.
24. Id.
25. Hartley, supra note 4, at 396. The General Counsel of the NLRB recently
signaled an intention to address some of these unexamined legal issues by revising its
casehandling instructions for cases involving certain pre-recognition agreements.
Memorandum from Richard A. Siegel, Associate General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers
(July 29, 2004) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review) (directing regional offices
of the General Counsel of the NLRB to refer to the Advice Division cases that (1) argue
that the recognition bar should apply to recognition granted pursuant to a pre-recognition
agreement; (2) complain that organizing campaigns involve unlawful assistance to a union;
or (3) complain that an agreement requires an employer to demand that "entities it owns
or does business with" enter neutrality agreements). But see Strom, supra note 3, at 65
(arguing that pre-recognition agreements actually further the policies of the NLRA).
26. Hartley, supra note 4, at 396.
27. See id. at 401-02.
28. Strom, supra note 3, at 52. But see UAW v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 557-58 (6th
Cir. 2002) (enforcing a neutrality agreement that was part of a collective bargaining
agreement).
29. See, e.g., NLRB Upholds Promise Not To Unionize Workers, MD. EMP. L.
LETTER (Littler Mendelson Corp., San Francisco, Cal.), Sept. 1999, at 6, 6 ("Lexington
House's owner announced his opposition to neutrality because 'that would be like inviting
the union in."').
30. See Estlund, supra note 20, at 1604.
31. Hartley, supra note 4, at 387-88.
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Employers might also exchange these agreements for a promise to end
litigation, picketing, publicity, or other political pressure, to secure union
support of political issues, or as part of the settlement of regulatory
disputes." However, these forms of leverage are unreliable because their
availability varies with the circumstances of employers, unions, and the
political landscape 3
II. INVESTMENT CAPITAL OFFERS LEVERAGE FOR PRE-RECOGNITION
AGREEMENTS
Investment capital is another, less direct source of leverage.34 Unlike
some forms of leverage, investment capital is leverage that is available
and effective regardless of the misfortunes, like litigation or political
problems, that an employer is experiencing.35 Thus, investment capital is
36leverage that applies in a broader range of circumstances. Its effects are
also potentially far-reaching. 7  Were an investor to require pre-
recognition agreements from all of the companies in which it invests, its
effect would be as broad as its investment portfolio.
Unions have two sources of investment capital that they might be able
to deploy directly or indirectly to secure pre-recognition agreements.
One source is union assets, obtained through initiation fees, dues, and
the like.39  Unions themselves have amassed capital in amounts
sufficiently large enough to be able to invest in companies and receive
pre-recognition agreements in return.40 For example, in 2000, the United
Auto Workers (UAW) bought stock in Pro Air.41 Pro Air was not
unionized at the time. 2 In return, the UAW managed to obtain a pre-
recognition agreement from Pro Air in addition to a number of benefits
for UAW members. 3
Another possible source of investment leverage is union members'
pension funds." This source of investment leverage is substantial.
Private pension plans subject to federal pension fund regulations
32. Id. at 389-93.
33. See Estlund, supra note 20, at 1604.
34. See Hartley, supra note 4, at 394-96.
35. Cf. id. at 389-94.
36. See id. at 395-96 & 395 n.132.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Michigan Memo, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 5,2000, at 14B.
40. See Hartley, supra note 4, at 395 n.132.
41. Michigan Memo, supra note 39.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Hartley, supra note 4, at 395.
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comprise over $4.4 trillion in assets.45 Defined benefit plans constitute
approximately $2 trillion.46  Collectively bargained plans constitute
almost $1 trillion of those dollars.47  Those plans have a number of
investment vehicles available that might be used to secure pre-
recognition agreements. One way of using these assets to obtain pre-
recognition agreements is to make the agreement a condition of directly
investing in private firms through a private equity security.4 This type of
investment offers the advantage of a privately negotiated transaction,
which allows the investor to "demand special covenants requiring union
neutrality and card check recognition. ',49 Another option would be to
invest in pooled funds. 0 For example, the Housing Investment Trust
(HIT) is a fund that invests its $2 billion in assets "primarily in mortgages
and mortgage-backed securities."'" Apart from financing housing built
entirely by union labor, HIT requires owners and operators of its real
estate developments to adopt neutrality and card check agreements.52
Similarly, the Building Investment Trust (BIT), with assets of $1.5
billion, finances commercial construction projects like hotels, commercial
buildings, and retail properties.53 Like HIT, BIT requires its borrowers
to sign neutrality and card check agreements." Yet another example is
the Union Labor Life Insurance Company (ULLICO) Separate Account
P, with $100 million in assets. 5' Through its private equity placements,
ULLICO has required neutrality and card check agreements." Stillother examples include the Paladin Capital Partners Fund, LP, with $208
45. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 12, PRIVATE
PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 1999 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS 4 (2004),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/1999pensionplanbulletin.pdf. But see Teresa
Ghilarducci, Small Benefits, Big Pension Funds, and How Governance Reforms Can Close
the Gap, in WORKING CAPITAL: THE POWER OF LABOR'S PENSIONS 158, 165 (Archon
Fung et al. eds., 2001) (estimating the 1999 figure to total $6.5 trillion).
46. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., supra note 45, at 4; Ghilarducci, supra note
45, at 165.
47. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., supra note 45, at 12.
48. Michael Calabrese, Building on Success: Labor-Friendly Investment Vehicles and
the Power of Private Equity, in WORKING CAPITAL: THE POWER OF LABOR'S PENSIONS,
supra note 45, at 93-94, 96.
49. Id. at 96.
50. See id. at 94.
51. Id. at 109.
52. Id. at 109-10.
53. Christian Murray, AFL-CIO To Invest In Apartment Venture, NEWSDAY (Long
Island, N.Y.), June 26, 2003, at A51.
54. See, e.g., Calabrese, supra note 48, at 110; Stephen Stuart, Poydras Hotel Project
Seeks Labor Funding, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS., Mar. 19,2001, at 1.
55. Calabrese, supra note 48, at 100.
56. Id. at 100-02.
2005] 1319
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million in assets, and SCP Private Equity Partners II, LP, with $513
million.5' Union pension funds have invested their assets in all of these
funds, and all of these funds require neutrality agreements."
If only it were as simple as locating investment funds and using them as
leverage for union objectives. Unions do not have direct control over the
pension funds that employers sponsor or contribute to because the funds'
assets are held in trust and controlled by trustees. 9  Furthermore,
employer-sponsored funds are under no obligation to select union
members or representatives as trustees. 6° In fact, employers, like unions,
are expressly permitted to select members from within their organization
61 pato be trustees for the pension plans they sponsor. Only plans covered
by §302(c)(5) of the Taft-Harley Act, called "Taft-Hartley Funds," have
a statutorily mandated equal number of employer and union-appointed
trustees.62 However, as this paper later explores, even union-selected
trustees are not free to implement investment strategies motivated by the
61
benefits they confer on a union or employer. Pension plans are
governed by ERISA, a complex set of rules that limits how pension fund
fiduciaries can manage plan assets.6 Both ERISA and the equivalent
portions of the Taft-Harley Act limit the actions of pension fund trustees,
investment managers, and, in very special circumstances, even unions.
Other articles have discussed the legality of union-friendly investing in
general under the broad categories of economically targeted investments
(ETIs) 66 and socially responsible investments (SRIs). 67 ETI and SRI are
57. See AM. FED'N OF LABOR, CONG. OF INDUS. ORGS., REPORT OF THE
INVESTMENT PRODUCT REVIEW WORKING GROUP: PRIVATE CAPITAL 2002 21, 23
(2002), available at http://www.aflcio.org/corporateamericalcapitallupload/2002-IPR.pdf.
58. Id.
59. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(c)(5)(A), 1103(a) (2000).
60. See id. §§ 1102(c), 1108(c)(3).
61. Id. § 1108(c)(3).
62. Id. § 186(c)(5) (stating that "employees and employers are equally represented").
63. See infra text accompanying notes 160-66.
64. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005).
65. See id. §§ 1105-06.
66. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1078-81
(1998); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, High Performance Investing: Harnessing the Power of
Pension Funds To Promote Economic Growth and Workplace Integrity, 11 LAB. LAW. 59,
60-62, 65, 86-89, 92-93, 127 (1995) [hereinafter Zanglein, High Performance Investing];
Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Protecting Retirees While Encouraging Economically Targeted
Investments, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 47 (1995) [hereinafter Zanglein, Protecting
Retirees]; Edward A. Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments: A Critical Analysis, 6
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39, 39, 41, 43-44, 46 (1997) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Economically
Targeted Investments]; Edward J. Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor:
Economically Targeted Investments, IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 333, 344 (1995); Thomas M. Griffin, Note, Investing Labor
[Vol. 54:13131320
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terms that broadly apply to investments selected for the benefits they
generate apart from mere financial returns. This paper contends that
general conclusions about ETIs and SRIs do not apply to pre-recognition
agreements. Specific characteristics of investments that incorporate pre-
recognition agreements set them apart from the general run of ETIs or
SRIs.69 As this paper will demonstrate, courts interpret ERISA to largely
prohibit ETIs or SRIs. 0 However, investment strategies that demand
pre-recognition agreements differ from ETIs or SRIs in general.
71
ERISA would not prevent pension plans from demanding pre-
recognition agreements as it would ETIs or SRIs because, unlike ETIs or
SRIs, a demand for pre-recognition agreements can be motivated by an
interest based purely on the security or return of an investment. 72 As this
paper explains, the result of this distinction is that ERISA may permit
pension plans to seek pre-recognition agreements as part of an
investment strategy even though ERISA would prohibit other ETIs or
SRIs.73
III. ERISA PLACES LIMITS ON HOW TO INVEST PLAN ASSETS
Generally, the use of assets in private pension plans is governed by
ERISA.14 ERISA categorizes both defined contribution plans, such as
401(k) plans, 5 and defined benefit plans, which promise a certain level of
Union Pension Funds in Workers: How ERISA and the Common Law Trust May Benefit
Labor by Economically Targeting Investment, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 11, 17, 23, 26, 38, 42-
44 (1998).
67. See, e.g., Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1143-44, 1146-48
(1988); Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus
Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2-4, 14, 27, 40, 42-44 (1992); John
H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 72, 88-90 (1980).
68. See Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66, at 60.
69. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 66, at 1030 ("The empirical evidence shows
that, overall, unions reduce profits that can be distributed to shareholders.").
70. See infra text accompanying notes 101-23.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 222-32.
72. E.g., Zanglein, Protecting Retirees, supra note 66, at 47-48.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 210-11.
74. Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities. More Is Not
Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 63 (1998). Note that ERISA applies to welfare
benefit plans as well as pension plans. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-(2) (2000). This paper is
concerned solely with pension plan funds. Courts have examined the separate issue of
what constitutes a plan, see, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9-13
(1987), but that issue is outside of the scope of this paper.
75. See I.R.C. § 401 (k)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).
2005]
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income after retirement, as "pension plans."76 In either case, pension
plan assets generally must be held in trust.
77
The portion of ERISA that is most relevant to pension plan
investment is the section that outlines the duties of plan fiduciaries.
ERISA imposes certain duties on plan fiduciaries, which broadly
includes anyone who has discretion over, controls, or administers the
plan or its assets, or receives compensation for investment advice.7 s First
among these duties is that fiduciaries must use plan assets only for the
benefit of plan participants and for reasonable expenses of administering
the plan (the "exclusive benefit rule"). 9  Second, in fulfilling this
obligation, fiduciaries must do so with the care and skill of a prudent
person in a like capacity under circumstances similar to those present at
the time (the "prudent expert standard"). s Third, fiduciaries must
generally diversify the investment of plan assets to minimize the risk of
large losses to the plan (the "diversification rule").8 ' Finally, fiduciaries
must act in accordance with plan documents.7
Collectively bargained pension funds sponsored by a union but funded
by employers are subject to additional requirements. Although § 302 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) generally prohibits
employers from giving unions money,83 it also creates exceptions,
including one for pensions or other benefits for employees. 84 Thus, an
employer is not prohibited from contributing to a fund established by the
union if, among other things, the assets are held in trust.85 Like the sole
interest rule in ERISA, the LMRA requires the plan to use its assets for
the exclusive purpose of participants and beneficiaries. 8  However,
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2000).
77. Id. § 1103(a)(1).
78. Id. § 1002(21)(A). A person can become a fiduciary through various means, even
unintentionally. The agreement creating the plan must name a fiduciary. Id. § 1102(a)(1).
Also, someone who has or exercises discretionary authority or control over the plan, its
assets, or its administration is a fiduciary to the extent they exercise that authority or
control. Id. § 1002(21)(A). Finally, anyone who renders investment advice to the plan for
direct or indirect compensation is a fiduciary. Id.
79. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
80. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
81. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
82. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
83. Id. § 186(a).
84. Id. § 186(c).
85. Id. § 186(c)(5).
86. Id. In actuality, the pertinent LMRA and ERISA language differs. The LMRA
states that Taft-Hartley plans must use their assets "for the sole and exclusive benefit of
the employees." Id. Similarly, ERISA § 404 requires that fund assets be used "solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of (i)
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable
[Vol. 54:13131322
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unlike ERISA, the LMRA requires an equal number of employer
representatives and employee representatives as trustees.87 This last
requirement is significant because these employee representatives are
often a union-friendly voice in the management of a Taft-Hartley fund.
Fiduciaries contemplating the use of plan assets to leverage pre-
recognition agreements must satisfy the above requirements lest they
violate Federal law and, in some cases, become personally liable to the
891plan for losses.
Courts and commentators disagree on how strictly fiduciaries must
abide by these dutes.90 This disagreement arises primarily out of varying
interpretations of the sole interest rule, the exclusive benefit rule, and the
rules governing who is a beneficiary. 9' Proponents of alternative
investment strategies claim that Congress intended ERISA to be flexible
enough to allow secondary or incidental interests-such as placing capital
only in union-friendly investments or actively negotiating pre-recognition
agreements with their investments-to play a role in deciding how to
invest plan assetsY. However, a close reading of the statutory text and
related court decisions strongly suggest the contrary.93 To the extent that
a fiduciary factors the benefits that an investment would generate for
third parties into his decision to pursue an investment, he is in breach.
4
Nonetheless, this strict duty does not preclude the fiduciary from
choosing or being motivated by the presence of a pre-recognition• 95
agreement as part of an investment. In fact, as this paper will explain, itwould in some cases be consonant with the fiduciary's duty to seek a pre-
expenses of administering the plan." Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A). Despite the minor differences,
courts have interpreted the two requirements to be equivalent. See, e.g., Local 144
Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 592 (1993); see also EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS COMM., AM. BAR ASS'N, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 808 (Steven J. Sacher et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2000) (stating that the LMRA does not preempt ERISA); JOHN H.
LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 861 (3d ed.
2000).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).
88. Cf Schwab & Thomas, supra note 66, at 1077. Indeed, some employee
representatives are so adamantly union-friendly that Taft-Hartley plans have been
described as "union dominated." Id. ("Despite the balanced board membership, unions
have tended to dominate these jointly managed funds.").
89. 29U.S.C. § 1109(a).
90. Compare Zanglein, Protecting Retirees, supra note 66, at 47, with Zelinsky,
Economically Targeted Investments, supra note 66, at 39.
91. See Zanglein, Protecting Retirees, supra note 66, at 47-48; see also 29 U.S.C. §§
1002(8), 1104(a)(1). But see Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments, supra note 66,
at 41-42.
92. See, e.g., Boyle v. Anderson, 68 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1995).
93. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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recognition agreement when the investee-employer's opposition to
unionization may affect the return on an investment directly or
indirectly. 6 At the same time, this narrow interpretation of fiduciary
duties would prevent an employer from abusing the ability to consider
incidental benefits to make improper investments. 97  For example,
fiduciary duties might prevent an employer from investing plan assets in
itself or related companies, because such an investment could be seen as
motivated only by incidental considerations.98  Under a strict
interpretation of fiduciary duties, incidental considerations are not
permissible motives.99
A. The Duty of Loyalty and the Sole Interest Rule Limit Those Parties a
Fiduciary May Intend to Benefit
The first limit on a fiduciary's discretion in selecting investments is the
duty of loyalty, also known as the "sole interest rule."' ° As stated in 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries."'0 ' This statutory language
limits a fiduciary's motives for taking action. It allows a fiduciary to act
only if the intent behind the action is to benefit plan participants and
beneficiaries. 1 2 It does not permit an intent to benefit other parties.' 3
Whether a fiduciary satisfies the duty of loyalty depends entirely on who
the intended beneficiary is.'04
Courts have interpreted this rule strictly.0 5 As a result, the duty of
loyalty prevents fiduciaries from making decisions based on competing
interests or loyalties divided between, for example, themselves and
96. See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 138-68.
98. Cf Brauer Lumber & Supply Co. v. Detroit Lumber & Bldg. Ass'n, No. 87-CV-
71625-DT, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18238, at *6-*7 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 1988) (stating that
an employer is not a participant or beneficiary and therefore not owed a fiduciary duty).
99. Cf. Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments, supra note 66, at 41. But see
Boyle v. Anderson, 68 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1995).
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cook, 567 F. Supp. 225, 236 (E.D. Va. 1983) (finding that
the fiduciaries did not exclusively intend to benefit participants and their beneficiaries in
performing their duties).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Toensing v. Brown, 374 F. Supp. 191, 198 (N.D. Cal. 1974) ("Though the
trustees are held to high standards, they were not intended to be subjected by § 186(c)(5)
to a court's speculation as to their motivation behind a decision in the absence of
substantial evidence .... (emphasis added)); see also Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 279
(3d Cir. 1995); Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments, supra note 66, at 43.
105. See, e.g., Davidson, 567 F. Supp. at 236; Toensing, 374 F. Supp. at 197.
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participants.'0 For example, in Donovan v. Bierwirth,""7 the employer's
officers functioned as plan trustees. They managed the plan's
investments, so they were fiduciaries liable for their investment
decisions.'09 The officers used plan assets to purchase stock in the
employer to avert a threatened takeover of the employer corporation. 0
They acted without considering the plan at all."' Consequently, both the
trial and appellate courts determined that they did not act in the interest
of the plan because they did not separate the employer's interest from
the plan's interest. '
The duty of loyalty operates similarly in Taft-Hartley plans."3
Although the dual-appointment structure of Taft-Hartley plans appears
to pit the conflicting interests of the employer against the union through
their appointment of an equal number of trustees, the trustees do not
represent the interests of either union or employer."4  The Court
explained that "Congress intended.., to prevent trustees 'from engaging
in actions where there would be a conflict of interest with the fund, such
as representing any party dealing with the fund."' 5 The duty of loyalty
in the common law of trusts, from which ERISA draws its fiduciary
duties, further bolsters the concept that trustees must be impartial to
both union and employer interests."' As one court described, "all
consideration of the interests of third parties must be excluded. His must
be an undivided loyalty."
'" 7
106. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 334 (1981) ("The language and legislative
history of § 302(c)(5) and ERISA therefore demonstrate that an employee benefit fund
trustee is a fiduciary whose duty to the trust beneficiaries must overcome any loyalty to
the interest of the party that appointed him."); see also Concrete Pipe and Prods., Inc. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 616 (1993).
107. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982).
108. Id. at 267.
109. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A), 1105(b) (2000).
110. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 269.
111. Id. at 275.
112. Id. at 276 ("[T]heir judgment on this score could scarcely be unbiased. ). The
district court also found the officers' actions to breach their duty to the plan beneficiaries.
See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("They have manifested
an inability to separate their corporate loyalty and their loyalty to the Pension Plan.").
113. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (referring to "a trust fund established . . . for the sole
and exclusive benefit of the employees").
114. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 334(1981).
115. Id. at 333-34 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-383, at 31-32 (1973)).
116. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,224-25 (2000).
117. Henley v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 322 So. 2d 688, 695 (Ala. 1975) (quoting
Barker v. First Nat'l Bank, 20 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D.C. Ala. 1937)) (describing the duty of
loyalty in the common law of trusts).
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Generally, this duty of loyalty, along with the other fiduciary duties
discussed in Part IV of this paper,"' requires fiduciaries to choose
investments largely on the basis of their financial characteristics."'
Under this interpretation of the duty of loyalty, a fiduciary may not
consider factors that do not have a bearing on financial return.20 The
rationale behind this interpretation is that the purpose of the plan is to
accumulate sufficient assets to be able to provide retirement benefits as
they become due12 This goal is purely financial, so a fiduciary should be
motivated by purely financial considerations.
2
1
In contrast, proponents of ETIs and SRIs contend that the duty of
loyalty allows plan fiduciaries to consider other variables, especially ones
that do not affect the financial attributes of an investment." Indeed, the
non-financial benefits, or collateral benefits, to non-participants are the
motivation behind the ETI and SRI strategies. For example, a general
collateral benefit of investing in unionized companies is the jobs it
creates for members of any union.2 5 Alternatively, a collateral benefit
might be direct, such as when a union's investment creates jobs for its
own members.2 6 In either case, the continued income for working union
members is clearly in the present interest of participants, because many
of them are also employees."' Furthermore, the continuation of
employer contributions to the plan, which depends on members being
employed, is in the interest of all participants because any income to the
plan, including increased contributions, increases the plan's ability to
provide participants with benefits. ETI and SRI supporters justify thepursuit of these collateral benefits on the grounds that the interest in jobs
118. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing other duties of a fiduciary in selecting an
investment).
119. See Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments, supra note 66, at 43.
120. See id.
121. Zanglein, Protecting Retirees, supra note 66, at 49 (noting that "[t]o introduce
other social objectives may be to dilute this primary objective [of protecting retirement
income]" (alterations in original) (quoting Ian D. Lanhoff, The Social Investment of
Private Pension Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 LAB. L. J. 387, 389
(1980)).
122. See id. at 48.
123. See, e.g., Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66, at 90.
124. Griffin, supra note 66, at 17.
125. See Calabrese, supra note 48, at 95.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. However, ERISA does not allow the plan or participants to exchange
future retirement benefits for current interests, like contributions in the present. See
Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments, supra note 66, at 342 ("[T]he 'benefits' to
which section 404(a)(1)(A)(i) refers are retirement, disability and death payments and not
pre-retirement economic advantages like employment.").
[Vol. 54:13131326
Caveat Fiduciarius
or contributions remains secondary to the primary purpose of the
investment, to gain a return to be able to provide retirement benefits,
which the investment also achieves.9 Commentators claim that, so long
as the motivation to benefit the union is subordinate to the motivation to
obtain an investment return that is comparable to other investments, the
secondary interest is ostensibly permissible. 3°
The Department of Labor has interpreted the duty of loyalty to allow
fiduciaries to consider collateral benefits under very strict
circumstances.13' So long as the fiduciary complies with the other
fiduciary duties, discussed below in Part IV of this paper, 132 and the
particular investment does not compromise the fund by increasing risk or
reducing the return available from comparable investments, the fiduciary
is not in breach. ' However, the standard that the Department of Labor
sets for a permissible collateral benefit is high because the investment
must anticipate returns equal to or greater than that of similar
investments.34 The Department acknowledges that
because every investment necessarily causes a plan to forgo
other investment opportunities, an investment will not be
prudent if it would be expected to provide a plan with a lower
rate of return than available alternative investments with
commensurate degrees of risk or is riskier than alternative
available investments with commensurate rates of return.1
35
In theory, ETIs or SRIs could satisfy this standard; in reality, however,
ETIs or SRIs might involve a compromise in financial performance that
would render them impermissible by Department of Labor standards. 3 '
129. See Zanglein, Protecting Retirees, supra note 66, at 52.
130. See, e.g., id.
131. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (1994).
132. See discussion infra Part IV.
133. See, e.g., Op. Employee Benefits Security Administration 98-04A (1998),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory98/98-04a.htm. The opinion explains that
if the above requirements [of considering the role of a particular investment
course of action in the plan's investment portfolio, taking into account such
factors as diversification, liquidity, and risk/return characteristics] are met, the
selection of a "socially-responsible" mutual fund as either a plan investment or a
designated investment alternative for an ERISA section 404(c) plan would not,
in itself, be inconsistent with the fiduciary standards set forth in sections 403(c)
and 404(a)(1) of ERISA.
Id.
134. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000)).
135. Id.
136. Compare Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments, supra note 66, at 46
("Insofar as ventures marketed as economically targeted investments are being shunned in
the marketplace, that suggests that such investments are not competitive .... "), with
Calabrese, supra note 48, at 110-11 ("Although a 15-percent interest rate of return over 12
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Also, a standard that allows fiduciaries to consider secondary interests,
like collateral benefits, to motivate fiduciaries, even if those interests are
subordinate to the goal of providing retirement benefits, interprets other
ERISA definitions too loosely.137  The sole interest rule prevents
fiduciaries from acting in the interest of anyone but participants and
beneficiaries."" Unions are not participants because ERISA does notS• 139
define them as participants. ERISA defines participants solely in terms
of their eligibility to receive plan benefits.'" A participant is "any
employee or former employee of an employer, or any member ... of an
employee organization who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit"
from a plan.'4' Employees or union members, not unions or employers,
become eligible for benefits.'42 The distinction between participants and
the union in which they were members was the subject of a case that
preceded ERISA but is often cited to clarify the duty of loyalty.
43
Blankenship v. Boyle' 44 noted how the United Mine Workers of America
(UMWA) used assets from its members' pension funds to purchase
shares in power companies. 14 The UMWA intended to use its position
as a shareholder to influence the companies to buy coal from unionized
suppliers.'" However, even though the UMWA pension plan might have
obtained additional pension contributions as a result of increased union
coal production, the court distinguished between benefits to participants
and benefits to the union. 147 Based on this distinction, the court found
that the UMWA breached its duty to act solely in the interest of its
participants and beneficiaries. 14 A plan's action would violate the duty
"of loyalty if it were actually an effort by plan trustees to ... advance
years would be market rate for an equity fund, the Boilermakers' [Co-Generation and
Infrastructure] Fund [that requires union labor on projects it finances] takes less risk ...
137. See Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments, supra note 66, at 41.
138. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
139. See id. § 1002(7).
140. See id.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. See id. § 1053(a) ("Each pension plan shall provide that an employee's right to his
normal retirement benefit is nonforfeitable .... " (emphasis added)).
143. Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
144. 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
145. Id. at 1105.
146. Id. at 1106.
147. Id.
148. Id. Although the court decided Blankenship before ERISA took effect, it is often
cited for its application of the analogous pre-ERISA duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Paul J.
Wessel, Comment, Job Creation for Union Members Through Pension Fund Investment,
35 BuFF. L. REV. 323, 343 (1986).
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union goals.', 149 Unions and their membership, whether related to the
plan or not, are third parties to the relationship between the fund and
participants as employees or retirees.5" Thus, the sole interest rule
prevents fiduciaries from being motivated by any benefit to unions or
union members as such, as opposed to union members as employees or
retirees. In short, it would be impermissible for any union to leverage
pension funds to secure a pre-recognition agreement as part of an
investment if doing so was motivated by an interest in benefiting the
union or its members in their capacity as anything other than employees
or current or future retirees.1
Despite these distinctions, commentators have argued that courts
nonetheless permit a secondary purpose so long as there is a legitimate
primary purpose.52 These decisions import the primary purpose test
from other areas of the law.5 3 They understand investments that, by
statute, must be chosen solely in the interest of participants and
beneficiaries to permit investments that have the primary purpose of
acting on behalf of participants and beneficiaries. However, the
primary purpose test bypasses the bright-line test iterated in ERISA.'
5
The primary purpose test has been described as "[t]hat uncertain and
difficult test" in other contexts because it is difficult for courts to weigh
facts and circumstances to discover a single subjective motive, and even
156
more difficult to determine the priority of multiple motives. Moreover,
even courts that have interpreted ERISA to permit some incidental
benefits do not legitimize fiduciaries who base their decision on
incidental benefits, even if only in part. 1 7 In fact, even these courts
require fiduciaries to act in the sole interest of participants as retirees:
"[Trustee's] decisions must be made with an eye single to the interests of
the participants and beneficiaries."" In other words, a fiduciary's
149. Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Trans., Inc.,
472 U.S 559, 571 n.12 (1985) (emphasis added).
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(D) (2000) ("The term 'party in interest' means, as to an
employee benefit plan ... an employee organization any of whose members are covered
by such plan .... ").
151. Of course, this raises the separate question: if the failure to obtain a neutrality
agreement is adverse to the interest of participants and beneficiaries, would seeking them
become permissible or even mandatory?
152. See Zanglein, Protecting Retirees, supra note 66, at 48.
153. See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970)
(applying the primary purpose test to tax matters).
154. See Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66, at 90; Zanglein,
Protecting Retirees, supra note 66, at 48.
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
156. Woodward, 397 U.S. at 577-78.
157. See, e.g., Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
158. Id. (emphasis added).
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decision can result in a benefit to third parties, but the incidental benefit
must not have motivated the decision. The only permissible fiduciary
motive is that which is on behalf of only participants and beneficiaries.
Commentators have also argued that, despite the express language in
section 40 4 (a), ERISA actually contemplates dual loyalty.15 9  For
example, "employers and employees are both settlors and beneficiaries,
[so] [d]ual loyalty is simply a recognition of this basic point."' 6 However,
neither the statute nor binding authority supports this argument. First,
the explicit statutory language contradicts their conclusion.16 1 Courts
have found that fiduciaries must act in the sole interest of participants,
not the sole interest of participants and employers. 6 2 Second, ERISA's
definition does not incorporate employers of either participants or
beneficiaries: "'[P]articipant' means any employee or former employee..
• or any member ...of an employee organization [and] '[b]eneficiary'
means a person designated by a participant.""' Third, ERISA explicitly
states that the "assets of a plan [will not] inure to the benefit of [the]
employer."' 4 Thus, insofar as binding court authority has interpreted
ERISA duties to derive from the common law of trusts, ERISA must
also sever employers' and employees' interests as settlors from
beneficiaries' interests.165 Moreover, adhering to the common law of
trusts and thereby forbidding ERISA participants and beneficiaries from
exchanging future retirement benefits for current ones better
accomplishes the explicit goal of pension plans covered by ERISA, which
is to "provide[] retirement income to employees, or .. .result[] in a
deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond."' The fact that neither
unions nor employers can use pension plan assets to their benefit, even if
159. See, e.g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note 67, at 1126.
160. Id.
161. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000) ("[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries ...."). The
statute does allow exceptions for refund of certain payments and in the event of plan
termination. Id.
162 See, e.g., Hickman v. Tosco Corp., 840 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir. 1988) ("'ERISA
does not prohibit an employer from acting in accordance with its interests as employer
when not administering the plan or investing its assets."' (quoting Phillips v. Amoco Oil
Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1471 (11th Cir. 1986))); Trenton v. Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806, 809
(3d Cir. 1987).
163. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(7)-(8).
164. Id. § 1103(c)(1).
165. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
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only incidentally, is crucial to the viability of employee pensions.
67
Allowing collateral benefits to either party in the fiduciary decision-
making process could open the door to legal justifications for abuse by
both. 1
68
B. The Exclusive Benefit Rule Limits the Kind of Benefit a Fiduciary May
Provide, and Further Limits Who the Fiduciary May Intend to Receive It
Another limitation on fiduciary conduct is the exclusive benefit rule.
The exclusive benefit rule limits the outcome of fiduciary acts by
specifying the kind of benefit that a fiduciary may provide, and, by
implication, to whom the fiduciary may provide it.69 Section 406(a) of
ERISA further bolsters this rule by prohibiting specific kinds of
transactions between the plan and statutorily defined parties in interest:
"A fiduciary ... shall not cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he
knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or
indirect .. use . . . for the benefit of a party in interest, of any assets of
the plan.",70 A union is a party in interest to a plan whose participants
are members of that union."' As a result, ERISA expressly bars a plan
from transactions that use plan assets to benefit unions that represent its
employees.
The paradox for fiduciaries is that any investment of plan assets
indirectly benefits third parties. 2 The entity in which a plan invests will
benefit merely by having use of the plan's capital. In other cases, the
employer may benefit indirectly, because an investment return that
exceeds the plan's actuarial assumptions would permit the employer to
reduce the amount of its contributions as long as it maintained the same
level of benefits for participants.' Still a third outcome is a collateral
167. Cf. James D. Hutchinson & Charles G. Cole, Legal Standards Governing
Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340, 1360
(1980).
168. Cf Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More Is Not
Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 105 (1998); Wessel, supra note 148, at 363.
169. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
170. Id. § 1106(a)(1).
171. Id. § 1002(14)(D).
172. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 67, at 1118.
173. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 86, at 45-46. If a plan's investment
experience sufficiently cxceeds the return anticipated by its actuarial assumptions, the
sponsoring employer may opt to reduce or cease contributions as long as the plan remains
sufficiently funded. Id. In effect, the employer is using plan assets to secure benefits, but
also effectively reduces his own contributions. See Regina T. Jefferson, Striking a Balance
in the Cash Balance Plan Debate, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 513, 551 (2001). However, the
employer may not reduce vested benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g). Alternatively, the
employer could terminate the plan, capture the reversion of assets, and establish a new
plan. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 67, at 1150-52.
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benefit, which occurs when a party outside of the transaction benefits
from the transaction.174 That third party may be either a known or
unknown beneficiary of the transaction.75  For example, when any
investor buys stock in a unionized company based solely on its market
performance, the union would be an unknown beneficiary to the
transaction through the continued employment and related benefits to its
members and associated dues.
Commentators have argued that neither the sole interest rule nor the
exclusive benefit rule prohibits collateral benefits.'76 As the argument
goes, a pension plan that benefits union members by either creating jobs
for them or increasing pension contributions is within ERISA's
limitations.177 However, this line of reasoning fails to recognize a key
distinction: the only exclusive benefit that a plan may deliver to
participants is retirement or other deferred compensation benefits.'
This distinction has been described as "'evaluating the best interests of
beneficiaries in the abstract as beneficiaries."" 79  Supreme Court
precedent supports this distinction. In Local 144 Nursing Home
Pension Fund v. Demisay,'8 the Supreme Court briefly enunciated its
position that Taft-Harley plan fiduciaries must both discharge their
statutory obligation of loyalty and act in accordance with the statutory
purpose of the plan in order to avoid breach of fiduciary duty. 82 The sole
interest and exclusive benefit rule combination
relates, not to the purpose for which the trust fund is in fact
used (an unrestricted fund that happens to be used "for the sole
and exclusive benefit of employees" does not qualify); but
rather to the purpose for which the trust fund is "established,".
174. See Calabrese, supra note 48, at 107 (noting that the ProLoan Builders Fixed
Income finances "new home construction and complete renovations built with 100-percent
union labor").
175. See id. at 108.
176. E.g., Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66, at 89-90.
177. See Calabrese, supra note 48, at 95 (noting benefits such as hours of work and
increased contributions to the plan); Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66,
at 89-90 ("The exclusive benefit rule does not prohibit economically targeted investments
as long as the primary objective of the investment is to make a prudent investment ....").
178. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). In actuality, ERISA expressly permits plans to
provide other limited benefits to its members, such as loans. See id. § 1108(b).
179. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 67, at 1141 (quoting Danaher Corp. v. Chi.
Pneumatic Tool Co., 635 F. Supp. 246, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)); see also id. at 1147
("[Former] administrator of ERISA, Ian D. Lanhoff expressed the view that investing
must be done 'to protect the retirement income of the plan's participants'...." (quoting
Lanhoff, supra note 121, at 389)).
180. See Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581 (1993).
181. 508 U.S. 581 (1993).
182. Id. at 588-89.
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• .. The trustees' failure to comply with these latter purposes
may be a breach of their... fiduciary obligations ....'8'
The Supreme Court's holding in Local 144 applies to ERISA plans
generally. Under ERISA, pension plans have the express statutory
purpose of "providing retirement income to employees"''84 or "result[ing]
in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond.', 85  Thus, fiduciaries
whose purpose is to provide participants with benefits other than
retirement income or deferred income beyond termination are in breach.
The apparent effect of the Supreme Court's conclusion is that ERISA
prohibits pension fund trustees from even considering leveraging their
pension fund assets to secure pre-recognition agreements unless their
purpose is to provide retirement or other deferred compensation benefits
to participants. 86  Such a financially-based motive does not seem to
support the pursuit of pre-recognition agreements. However, as this
paper will discuss, fiduciaries may find that an entirely different set of
circumstances might motivate them and thereby render the pursuit
permissible. 187  Consequently, investments that appear to be
impermissible for one set of motives are permissible for other legitimate
motives.
The prohibited transactions section of ERISA supports the conclusion
that certain transactions that on their face appear to stem from improper
motives can, in actuality, be driven by the resulting financial benefits to
the plan."8 The prohibited transaction section is related to the exclusive
benefit rule. 89 Like the exclusive benefit rule, it prohibits transactions
that are motivated by a benefit to parties other than participants.!
Unlike the exclusive benefit rule, it explicitly defines the transactions
that it renders impermissible.' 9' Because of the specificity, § 406 of
ERISA seems to be the most restrictive to transactions that fall under its
coverage because it explicitly forbids them.
However, even prohibited transactions are not entirely
impermissible. 92 They are merely presumed to be not solely in the
183. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i) (2000).
185. Id. § 1002(2)(A)(ii).
186. See id.
187. See infra notes 221-35 and accompanying text.
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 1106; see also infra text accompanying notes 192-98.
189. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 67, at 1109.
190. 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
191. Id.
192. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 67, at 1108-09, 1153 (suggesting that the
"prohibited transactions" rule in ERISA § 406 is a variant of the exclusive benefit rule of
Catholic University Law Review
interest of beneficiaries and presumed not to be for their exclusive
benefit.'9 3 Parties may seek an exemption from the Secretary of Labor.' 9
An exemption allows fiduciaries to proceed with an otherwise prohibited
transaction.'9 Through presumptive prohibition, ERISA acknowledges
that certain types of transactions between parties closely related to the
plan are so likely to be in the interest of third parties that they are
presumed not to be for the exclusive benefit of participants. 9' Through
the exception mechanism, those transactions are scrutinized to determine
whether the financial interests of participants are in fact the motive.'9
Similarly, pre-recognition agreements generate benefits for third parties
that would constitute a prohibited motivation under the exclusive benefit
rule, but are driven in fact by permissible financial motives.
9 8
IV. OTHER FIDUCIARY DUTIES AFFECT THE ABILITY TO LEVERAGE
PRE-RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
The remaining duties of plan fiduciaries are to act prudently, diversify
plan assets, and administer the plan according to plan documents. Under
the "prudent expert" standard, a fiduciary must act "with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use" to conduct a similar enterprise.'99 This standard is largely
fact-based.2°°  Nonetheless, the Department of Labor published
regulations outlining the prudent investor.70' The fiduciary-as-investor
must consider an investment's risk, return, and liquidity in light of the
type of plan in question. 20 2 The diligence prong of the prudent expert
standard also requires a fiduciary to scrutinize the investment, using "the
proper methods to investigate, evaluate and structure the investment.,
20 3
A fiduciary's prudence is not measured by his returns, but by the
ERISA § 404(a)(1), which allows employers to recapture overpayments to a pension plan
without violating ERISA prohibition against assets inuring to the benefit of the employer
by simply terminating the plan).
193. See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464-65 (5th Cir. 1983).
194. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a).
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. E.g., Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221, 1245 (S.D. Fla. 1985), affd sub nom.
Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
200. See Zanglein, Protecting Retirees, supra note 66, at 54.
201. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2004).
202. Id.
203. Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286,299 (5th Cir. 2000).
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procedures he employs.2 4 Thus, there is no duty to maximize plan
returns. 0s Moreover, where the intent behind a fiduciary's action is in
question, prudent and diligent investigation will clarify whether the
fiduciary intended to benefit participants.2 06 The Fifth Circuit noted that
"conducting an investigation that is structured to remove the taint
associated with conflicting interests goes a long way toward satisfying the
duty of loyalty. '2 7  Related to the prudence standard is the duty to
diversify plan assets. Like the prudence requirement, particular
applications of it are fact-specific. 8 In general, the duty to diversify
requires a fiduciary to spread assets over a number of investments with
varying degrees of risk and varying levels of return.
The combined effect of these requirements on the ability to leverage
pre-recognition agreements is that, generally speaking, fiduciaries would
not be able to sacrifice investment performance for an incidental
benefit. 210 However, one of the advantages of pre-recognition
agreements, unlike ETIs or SRIs, is that evidence suggests that terms of
pre-recognition agreements, such as neutrality, might actually improve
investment returns. 1
Another product of the duties of prudence and diversification is to
dilute the potential effect of any one investor. A plan is unable to
leverage the full impact of its assets because a plan is prohibited from
allocating a large portion of its capital to one investment.2 2 This limit on
the comparative size of a single investment in turn limits the size of the
211company over which the plan could exercise its leverage. Smaller
amounts of capital available for any one transaction translate into less
leverage against any single company. 4 On the other hand, diversified
capital placement means the plan assets will spread over a larger number
204. Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1985), affd sub nom.
Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986).
205. See Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66, at 92. In fact, Zanglein
suggests that a duty to maximize returns would be unduly burdensome. Id.
206. See Bussian, 223 F.3d at 299 n.15.
207. Id.
208. See Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66, at 114 ("It is impossible
to define diversification in its numerical terms.").
209. Id. at 113.
210. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (2004).
211. See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text. However, other statistics suggest a
correlation between a unionized workforce and decreased company profitability, a factor
fiduciaries would be obliged to consider as well. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 66, at
1030. But see infra notes 221-35 and accompanying text.
212. See Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66, at 114.
213. See Calabrese, supra note 48, at 120.
214. C. id.
2005] 1335
Catholic University Law Review
of companies."' 5 Thus, the diversification requirement could have the
effect of broadening the number of companies covered by pre-
116recognition agreements. In sum, the prudence and diversification
requirements would limit pension funds to investing only a portion of
their assets in a number of relatively small, well-researched companies
that involve no compromised risk or return, and that fit reasonably
within the plans' investment portfolio.217
Lastly, fiduciaries have a duty to administer plan assets according to
plan documents."' However, fiduciaries are not completely insulated
when they act according to plan documents. Each of the fiduciary duties
imposed by ERISA preempts even the directions given to trustees,
investment managers, or other fiduciaries in investment guidelines or
investment policies." 9 Courts have held that, where plan documents and
the duties imposed by ERISA conflict, ERISA controls. 20 Thus, if
investment guidelines require an investment manager to invest a portion
of assets in one type of investment, but doing so would be imprudent, the
fiduciary is obligated to forego compliance with that portion of the
investment guidelines."" In conclusion, fiduciaries must exercise the
duties of loyalty, exclusive benefit, prudence, and diversification
regardless of the requirements imposed upon them by investment
policies or guidelines.
V. UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, PENSION PLAN FIDUCIARIES
MAY BE ABLE TO SEEK PRE-RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS FROM
COMPANIES IN WHICH THEY INVEST
Given that plan fiduciaries may not act with the intent to benefit third
parties and may not contemplate benefits which are not within the plan's
statutory purpose, it might appear that ERISA completely eliminates the
possibility that fiduciaries could require pre-recognition agreements from
215. See Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66, at 94, 116.
216. See id. at 115-16. For the inverse argument, see Schwab & Thomas, supra note
66, at 1078 (suggesting that union investment in unionized companies reduces their ability
to put pressure on non-union companies).
217. Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66, at 113 (discussing the
"whole portfolio approach").
218. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000).
219. See id.
220. See, e.g., Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995). The court stated
"we will presume that a fiduciary's decision to remain invested in employer securities was
reasonable. A plaintiff may then rebut this presumption of reasonableness by showing
that a prudent fiduciary acting under similar circumstances would have made a different
investment decision" involving an Employer Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), which is
exempt from the duty to diversify. Id.
221. See id.
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their employers. However, this conclusion is erroneous. First, an
employer's neutrality may have a direct positive impact on company
profitability. Employers expend significant amounts of human and
financial capital to resist unionization: "'[M]any businesses support this
goal [of resisting unionization] and are prepared to expend substantial
resources to achieve it.' 2 22 There is no indication that companies are
reducing their expenditures on anti-union activities. For example,
Avondale Industries spent an estimated $5.4 million to resist union
organizing, excluding costs arising out of violations of the NLRA.2 3
Avondale paid out another $2.15 million to settle its violations of federal
labor law. More recently, EnerSys paid a labor consultant $39,000 to
help combat unionization at its plant in South Carolina. 25 As early as the
mid-1980s, "management annually spen[t] an estimated $100 to $500
million to secure" labor consultants to counter union organizing
226campaigns. Moreover, these figures do not quantify the consequential
effects on investment returns caused by share volatility, decreased
productivity, or negative publicity.227
As with any other factor that a prudent investor takes into account
when assessing an investment, evidence may demonstrate a correlation
between employer neutrality, or other resistance to unionization, and the• . 228
desirability of a particular investment or category of investments.
Fiduciaries averse to the financial risks associated with vigorous
employer resistance to unionization would be justified in exacting pre-
recognition agreements from the companies in which they invest plan
222. Kenneth McLennan, Worker Representation and Participation in Business
Decisions Through Employee Involvement Programs, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 563, 568
(2001) (quoting RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 67
(1999)) (crediting other factors for the decline in union membership).
223. See Bruce Alpert, Navy To Pay Avondale's Union Fight Fees, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES PICAYUNE, June 17, 1999, at C1.
224. See Press Release, National Labor Relations Board, NLRB Distributes $2 Million
in Backpay to 61 Former Avondale Workers Under Settlement (May 8, 2002),
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/releases/r2453.asp.
225. Steven Greenhouse, How Do You Drive Out a Union? South Carolina Factory
Provides a Textbook Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at A26. Nevertheless, EnerSys paid
a $7.75 million settlement after being accused of committing 120 federal labor law
violations. Id.
226. Charles T. Joyce, Comment, Union Busters and Front Line Supervisors:
Restricting and Regulating the Use of Supervisory Employees by Management Consultants
During Union Representation Election Campaigns, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 453,456 n.8 (1987).
227. Cf Zanglein, Protecting Retirees, supra note 66, at 52 (hypothesizing that
picketing affects investment risk).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 222-27. Such a determination would likely
depend on investigation and/or expert advice as an extension of the duty to exercise
prudence. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
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assets.229  Also, while fiduciaries are not obligated to maximize
investment returns, ° they must, in exercising the duty of prudence, avoid
exposing plan assets to unnecessary risk.2 3 1 From this obligation, there
may be a duty to "'screen' or 'filter' . . . companies experiencing
'significant adverse financial developments.'
232
Plan trustees, fiduciaries, investment managers, and union agents
should all exercise caution as they explore new investment strategies
such as capital-pre-recognition agreement exchanges.233  Failing to
investigate these agreements, giving advice on their value, or exerting
influence on fiduciaries to pursue them could, among other things, make
any one of them personally liable for any plan losses.
2 4 Generally, a
fiduciary is a person who either exercises discretionary authority or
control over plan management or assets or gives investment advice for a
135 236
fee.235 Under ERISA, a "person" can include an employer or a union.
A person is a fiduciary only to the extent that he has discretionary
authority over, or gives advice to the plan.27 In addition, even a person
who is not assigned fiduciary responsibilities can become a functionalS •• 238
fiduciary by exerting influence on fiduciaries to make certain decisions.
Although a person's exercise of influence alone does not endow them
fiduciary status in every case, influence so great that a fiduciary
239
effectively abdicates his own discretion to the influential person does.For example, in Brock v. Hendershott,2'4 an area director of an
229. See infra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
231. See Zanglein, High Performance Investing, supra note 66, at 91.
232. BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE 35
(1986) (quoting Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,221, 37,224 n.7
(June 26, 1979)).
233. Cf Calabrese, supra note 48, at 123 (listing negative aspects of some investment
funds).
234. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
235. Id. § 1002(21).
236. Id. § 1002(9).
237. Maniace v. Commerce Bank, 40 F.3d 264, 267 (8th Cir. 1994) ("'[A] court must
ask whether a person is a fiduciary with respect to the particular activity in question."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Kerns v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 214, 217 (8th
Cir. 1993) (quoting Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 61 (4th Cir. 1992))));
see also Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (highlighting the Court's
interpretation of fiduciary under ERISA).
238. See Monson v. Century Mfg. Co., 739 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding an
employee who exercised discretion over the plan's management to be a fiduciary); Eaves
v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457-59 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding a corporate officer and director
who gave investment advice to be fiduciaries).
239. See Reich v. Lancaster, 55 F.3d 1034, 1048 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[niot all
persons who have an influential role in plan decisions are transmuted into fiduciaries").
240. 840 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1988).
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international union influenced plans to choose a particular service
provider.2 1  Because of this influence, he was a fiduciary who was
potentially liable for plan losses. 42 Thus, union officials should exercise
caution when encouraging certain types of investment to avoid fiduciary
status and the concomitant liability.
Fiduciaries who fail to act prudently in response to a breach by co-
fiduciaries are liable for that breach.2 3  Thus, in Taft-Hartley plans,
employer trustees who fail to act on their fellow trustees' imprudent
investment decisions could be held liable and vice versa. 2" Finally,
although fiduciaries who properly appoint an investment manager may
thereby insulate themselves from liability, they still have a duty to
241monitor his performance.
VI. UNIONS HAVE OTHER AVENUES OF DEPLOYING PENSION ASSETS
TO SECURE PRE-RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
Although only fiduciaries have control of plan assets, unions may use
their role as either plan sponsor or bargaining representative to influence
246a plan's investment decisions. Unions might bargain with employers to
create new plans or amend existing trust agreements or plan documents
with pre-recognition agreement provisions. These provisions would
establish investment strategies that direct the plan either to invest in
companies with existing pre-recognition agreements, to actively seek pre-
recognition agreements from direct investments, or to investigate the
costs of each investment's non-neutral labor positions.
The principle enunciated in a recent Supreme Court decision supports
such extra-financial motivations for bargaining for such provisions.
This principle is that a goal of ERISA is not only to increase the security
of anticipated retirement benefits, but also to provide incentives for
241. Id. at 342 (finding that a union official who influenced local unions to select
certain dental plans in order to gain a personal profit was a fiduciary). But see Wolin v.
Smith Barney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Not everyone who provides
investment advice to an ERISA plan is [a fiduciary]. A stock broker who merely touts
stocks to the plan is not.").
242. Brock, 840 F.2d at 342.
243. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2000).
244. See, e.g., Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 640 (W.D. Wis.
1979) (holding fiduciaries liable for neglecting to monitor their co-fiduciary's failure to
exercise care, skill, and prudence).
245. Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 134-35 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 858 F.2d 361 (7th Cir.
1988).
246. See Wessel, supra note 148, at 329.
247. Cf Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 167, at 1386.
248. See infra text accompanying notes 249-64.
249. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432. 436, 445 (1999).
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sponsors to create pension plans and to bargain for measures that control
plan losses.5 0 In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,2 51 the Supreme Court
reviewed, inter alia, an amendment to a pension plan that, in effect, used
surplus plan assets to increase benefits for some employees but
prevented new employees from contributing to the plan."' The plaintiff
claimed that the amendment reduced the employer's labor costs,
because, rather than the employer paying employees directly through
their regular compensation, the plan would pay the increase via pension
benefits, which the plan would eventually pay through its own assets.2 3
The Court affirmed two principles. First, ERISA is designed to foster
pension plan creation.5 4 Second, a plan sponsor may use plan assets to
leverage agreements for the purpose of controlling costs, so .'among the
"incidental" and thus legitimate benefits that a plan sponsor may receive
from the operation of a pension plan are attracting and retaining
employees[,] . . .settling or avoiding strikes[,] .. . and reducing the
likelihood of lawsuits. ' ' 2  The Court determined that disallowing
sponsors to bargain for this kind of incidental benefit is contrary to
2516
ERISA's goal of encouraging plan creation. While the Hughes Aircraft
plan involved an agreement between participants and a plan sponsor that
was also the employer, the principles-encouraging plan creation and
bargaining for loss control measures-apply equally when the settlor is
the union and when unions act as representatives of participants.257 Thus,
unions have legal justification for incorporating investment strategies
that implement pre-recognition agreements into plan documents,
because pre-recognition agreements might control plan losses by limiting
the negative effects of labor disputes or resistance to unionization on
258
plan investments, In doing so, they also insulate fiduciaries who are
obligated to discharge their duties in accordance with plan documents,
250. Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221, 1231 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd sub nom.
Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he court is mindful that it must reach
a result that safeguards the interests of fund participants and beneficiaries yet preserves the
institutional incentives for union's [sic] to establish pension funds." (emphasis added)).
251. 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
252. See id. at 436.
253. Id. at 445.
254. See id. at 446.
255. Id. at 445 (quoting Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 893-94 (1996)).
256. Id. at 445-46; cf Brower v. Comark Merch., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 n.5
(D.N.J. 1996).
257. Hughes Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 435-36; see also supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 222-32.
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because the goal of limiting plan losses is consonant with the duties of
plan fiduciaries.
As unions look to the future, they have two options. First, through
collective bargaining, they could demand that current investment
guidelines or investment policies be amended to include a requirement
that companies in which the plan invests adopt pre-recognition
agreements in exchange for the plan's investment in the company. This
kind of bargaining demand easily fits into the "quid pro quo" of
bargaining that Hughes Aircraft envisioned.2' 6 This approach would be
especially effective in single employer plans with employer-appointed
trustees T2 because employers that fail to honor the agreement to amend
would be subject to a claim for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement.262 Also, plan documents that incorporate pre-recognition
259. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000). Fiduciaries must comply with plan
documents as they discharge their duties. Id. Fiduciaries who act in compliance with plan
documents are generally insulated from liability. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S.
489, 527-28 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1457 (6th Cir.
1995) (involving an employer stock ownership plan (ESOP)). Nonetheless, fiduciaries
must comply with their other ERISA duties even when doing so contradicts plan
documents. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
260. See Spink, 517 U.S. at 893-94 (stating that "among the... legitimate benefits that
a plan sponsor may receive from the operation of a pension plan . . . [e]ach involves, at
bottom, a quid pro quo between the plan sponsor and the participant"). This theory
remains untested. In the pre-recognition agreement context, the bargaining is typically
between the sponsor employer and the participant's, or employee's, bargaining
representative. See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
261. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (stating that employers may appoint their own officers,
employees, or representatives as fiduciaries).
262. See Licensed Div. Dist. No. 1 v. Defries, 943 F.2d 474, 481 (4th Cir. 1991). The
Fourth Circuit found that:
Trusts are an integral part of collective bargaining because they are a product of
that process. Simply because the duties of a trustee, once appointed, are carried
out in an atmosphere quite different from the collective bargaining process does
not negate the fact that the trust agreements are part of the collective bargaining
process ....
Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (establishing that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
claims between employers and unions for violations of collective bargaining agreements);
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 559-60 (1968)
(deciding action for breach of collective bargaining clause). However, if the trustees or
other fiduciaries fail to honor the trust agreement, they are not agents of the employer.
See Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Admiral Merchs. Motor
Freight, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 38, 48 (D. Minn. 1980), affd sub nom. Cent. States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Jack Cole-Dixie Highway Co., 642 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1981). Furthermore, the employer does not have standing to sue for breach of fiduciary
duty. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); see also S. Ill. Carpenters Welfare Fund v. Carpenters
Welfare Fund, 326 F.3d 919, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2003); Grand Union Co. v. Food Employers
Labor Relations Ass'n, 808 F.2d 66, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As a result, the union would not
be able to enforce the trust agreement against trustees or fiduciaries through the
employer. However, unions may have standing to sue the plan on behalf of employees for
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agreement investment requirements would insulate fiduciaries that act in
accordance with those documents.263 Yet, another approach would be to
educate and encourage fiduciaries to investigate whether there is a
factual link between employer pre-recognition neutrality or opposition
and risk or return of their investments. Such a link would support a
plan's decision to demand pre-recognition agreements from the
companies in which they invest. 6
VII. CONCLUSION
Unions are faced with a paradox. Pre-recognition agreements promise
to invigorate unions by facilitating organizing campaigns. However,
unions may not always have recourse to reliable forms of leverage
necessary to obtain them. On the other hand, union members have
amassed substantial assets in their pension plans. Ironically, neither
members nor unions have direct control over the plans. Even where
unions can influence investment strategy, ERISA poses formidable
obstacles to union-friendly investment by preventing plan fiduciaries
from compromising investment returns for collateral benefits.
Nonetheless, investments that exchange investment capital for pre-
recognition agreements represent a promising solution. Forward-
thinking fiduciaries are in a position to carefully investigate whether
aggressive anti-union employer activity is likely to affect their
investments' risk or return. If there is a link, fiduciaries would be
justified in acting on behalf of plan participants to minimize the negative
impact of that activity on plan investments. At the same time, unions
should consider pension investment strategies as a subject for collective
bargaining. In this way, unions could negotiate investment strategies that
implement pre-recognition agreements directly into trust agreements.
Both options demonstrate that pension plans and unions can benefit each
other, but only if each is able to realize the other's full value.
failure to act in accordance with plan documents, a fiduciary breach under ERISA. See 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). Compare Carpenters Welfare Fund, 326 F.3d at 922 (reasoning
that unions have no self-interest in suits against plans, so unions have standing), with N.J.
State AFL-CIO v. New Jersey, 747 F.2d 891, 892-93 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that unions do
not have standing), and Sys. Council EM-3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. AT & T Corp.,
972 F. Supp. 21, 27-28 (D.D.C. 1997) (same), affd, 159 F.3d 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Thus,
this approach raises two issues: the remedies that would be available against the employer,
and the extent to which such terms are enforceable against the trustees.
263. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 527-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, when plan
documents conflict with fiduciary duties, such as prudence, fiduciary duties take
precedence. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 222-28.
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